独家！中国窃取美国W-88核弹头绝密资料

梧桐书生！

梧桐书生翻译

1995年的一天，一名中年华人男子走进东南亚某国的美国中央情报局（ＣＩＡ），向它提供了一些极其重要的中国文件。其中，就包含一份美国W-88核弹头的设计绝密文件。这种设计在导弹顶端的核弹头装配在三叉戟潜艇上。这名男子向中情局提供的信息看是荒诞，但却异乎寻常的真实。他说，他在中国核项目中工作，他有权力接触到被保存在资料库的机密文件。一天晚上某时，他潜入入资料库，搜集了上百份文件，把它们装进文件包里。然后把文件包从二楼的窗户扔了出去，以此避过警卫的检查。不巧的是，文件包被摔开了，这些文件散落在地上。他走出资料室后，他赶紧收起这些文件，把它们重新放回文件包。许多的文件还是有它们的情报价值。其中关于美国W-88核弹头的资料还是彻底震惊了美国反间谍机构，因为这里包含了核弹头设计资料的是美国高级别的绝密。

美国当时已经生产这种小型核弹头有数十年了，而中国人他们确是极度地渴望能找到怎样能制造小型核弹头的资料。中国的军方，到现在都还是在极力的追赶美国。中国成功地取得W-88核弹头的机密设计技术对美国反间谍机构来说就是一个极具震撼的例子，他们不得不慢慢地承认一个事实：那就是已经成为全球的经济强国，他们已经发展出了世界级的情报系统，是美国中情局是强大对手。

在冷战时期，美国联邦调查局和中情局的大量的美国反间谍机构是用在搜索苏维埃和俄国的情报。苏联情报机构——克勃格被视为敌人，而中国则放在次要位置。那时美国联邦调查局只要很少的一些关于中国情报的案子，而他们的工作也不认为是有职业提升前途的。没有把中国情报工作放在首要位置使得华盛顿遭受了不断的失败，以至中国在对美国的情报努力中取得很大成功。

中国的外国情报服务系统和军方的情报组织积极地活跃在美国国防工业，核武器实验室，硅谷和美国的情报组织和敏感目标上，以窃取情报。

在2010年1月，当国防部长罗伯特-盖茨访问中国时，北京公布了中国最新战斗机——J-20. J-20公开表明，中国已经取得战机隐形能力，并且能够把在美国花多年时间窃取的隐形技术应用到中国的战机，军舰和导弹上，以避过雷达的追踪。

本月晚些时候，一名在Northrop Grumman公司工作的工程师由于涉嫌把B-2隐形轰炸机的攻击技术机密透漏给中国而被判刑入狱32年。为了10万美元的报酬，这名工程师帮助中国设计一种巡航导弹隐形耗波系统，使得导弹很难被捕捉到和被摧毁。

在8月份，在呈给美国情报官员的报告中称，巴基斯坦已经允许中国专家检测美国黑鹰隐形直升飞机的残骸，这家直升飞机是再执行五月刺杀本拉登任务时而坠毁在巴基斯坦境内的。虽然巴基斯坦和中国否认这份报告的指责，但是北京对检查这架黑鹰直升机残骸还是表现出极大的兴趣。这架黑鹰直升机部件没有被美国海军海豹队摧毁掉，这就让中国能够了解更多美国的隐形技术。

同时，神秘的W-88核弹头设计资料泄露问题任然没有解决。开始，美国政府怀疑是在Los Alamos核科学家李文和泄露了W-88的资料。但是，没有证据现实李文和这样做过。李文和被单独关押8个月后，最终，被法院起诉触犯了安全条例的他却迎来了美国联邦法院负责这起案件的法官的意外道歉。

由于能源部的误导，联邦调查局抓错了人长达3年时间。最终，在1999年，罗伯特-布莱恩，联邦调查局的副主任，他招募了斯蒂芬-呆拉德，一名反间谍机构的老兵，他领导着对中国如何窃取W-88核弹头设计的大量调查。联邦调查局领导着对这起案件的调查，并且组织来自11个联邦机构的300名的调查员，这些机构包括国防部，中情局，国家安全局，军情局。在911事件中，被恐怖分子劫持的美国航空77航班撞击五角大楼的过程中，一些调查员被炸死。但是，调查任在继续进行中。呆拉德先生领导的组织力量是在公众的视线之外运作着，他们密切注视着加州的核武器实验室，政府机构，国防承包商，以及其生产W-88核弹头各种部件的其他州。

最终，四年以后，在美国的情报调查机构始终没有调查清楚中国到底是什么窃取没美国核弹头设计机密的情况下，这项调查宣告结束。最终的答案依旧锁在北京的档案里。

十几年来，中国的间谍持续不断的进行着对美国军事目标的情报活动。去年，一名五角大楼官员被判入狱，最后的10人被联邦调查局清理，他们所有成员都与东海岸西海岸的中国情报网络系统头子-林红保持有着或多或少的联系。一些信息，如，防止潜艇被发现的海军静音电子驱动系统，B-1轰炸机，美国向台湾军售计划等等都是通过这些情报系统传入中国。

中国甚至已经渗透到美国联邦调查局。在2003年，Katrina Leung，一名在联邦调查局工作20年的情报员，被发现是为北京工作的双料间谍。令人震惊的是，两名在加州联邦调查局负责着中国反间谍工作的高级探员，同时竟然和Katrina Leung有着业务往来，并且，其中一名探员帮助Katrina Leung收集文件，然后让她带回家里。

中国成功地窃取美国机密给美国情报机构带来着持续的挑战。而当前的华盛顿的反间谍机构，已经习惯了冷战的时期的舒适形式，现在他们现在主要精力和时间花在是针对的是基地组织上。因此，华盛顿必须重新定位和改变自己的优先事项和关注方向，要把更多的资源和能量转到来自东方的中国间谍身上。如果不这样做，更多的像w-88核弹头这样的绝密情报还会不断的通过它们的秘密渠道涌向北京。
英文：China’s Spies Are Catching Up

IN 1995, a middle-aged Chinese man walked into a C.I.A. station in Southeast Asia and offered up a trove of secret Chinese documents. Among them was a file containing the top-secret design of the American W-88 nuclear warhead that sits atop the missiles carried by Trident submarines.

He told a story to the C.I.A. that was so bizarre it might just be true. He said that he worked in China’s nuclear program and had access to the archive where classified documents were stored. He went there after hours one night, scooped up hundreds of documents and stuffed them into a duffel bag, which he then tossed out a second-story window to evade security guards. Unfortunately, the bag broke and the papers scattered.

Outside, he collected the files and stuffed them back into the torn bag. Although many of the documents were of interest for their intelligence content, it was the one about the W-88 that roiled American counterintelligence most because it contained highly classified details about a cutting-edge warhead design.

The United States had been producing small nuclear warheads for decades, and the Chinese were desperate to find out how to build miniaturized warheads themselves. China’s military was, and still is, playing catch-up to the United States.

China’s success in obtaining the secret design of the W-88 is the most dramatic example of a fact that United States counterintelligence agencies have been slow to recognize: just as China has become a global economic power, it has developed a world-class espionage service — one that rivals the C.I.A.

During the cold war, dozens of counterintelligence agents in the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. pursued Soviet and then Russian spies. The K.G.B. was seen as the enemy; China took a back seat. Only a handful of F.B.I. agents specialized in Chinese spy cases, and their work was not regarded as career-enhancing. Washington’s ongoing failure to make Chinese espionage a priority has allowed China to score a number of successes in its espionage efforts against the United States.

China’s foreign intelligence service and its military intelligence agency actively spy on the American defense industry, our nuclear weapons labs, Silicon Valley, our intelligence agencies and other sensitive targets.

In January, when Robert M. Gates, then the defense secretary, was visiting China, Beijing unveiled a stealth fighter jet, the J-20. The disclosure demonstrated that China had achieved a stealth capability, allowing it to conceal its planes, ships and missiles from radar — similar to the American stealth technology that China has been seeking to acquire by clandestine means for years.

Later that month, an engineer who worked on the B-2 stealth bomber for Northrop Grumman was sentenced to 32 years in prison for passing defense secrets to China. In exchange for more than $100,000, he had helped design a stealth exhaust system for China’s cruise missiles to make it difficult to detect and destroy them.

And in August, reports attributed to American intelligence officials asserted that Pakistan had allowed Chinese experts to inspect the remains of the stealth helicopter that crashed during the May mission to kill Osama bin Laden. Although Pakistan and China denied the reports, Beijing would have a great interest in examining the tail of the Black Hawk helicopter, the part of the aircraft that was not destroyed by the Navy Seals team, to learn more secret details of American stealth technology.

Meanwhile, the mystery of the leaked W-88 warhead design remains unsolved. At first, the American government suspected that Wen Ho Lee, a Los Alamos nuclear scientist, had leaked the W-88, but it produced no evidence that he had done so. He was held in solitary confinement for nine months, eventually pleaded guilty to one count of mishandling classified information and won an extraordinary apology from the federal judge who presided over the case.

Misled by the Energy Department, the F.B.I. had chased the wrong person for three years. Finally, in 1999, Robert Bryant, then the bureau’s deputy director, enlisted Stephen Dillard, a veteran counterintelligence agent, to head a major investigation of how China had acquired the design of the W-88.

The inquiry was led by the F.B.I. and run by a task force of 300 investigators from 11 federal agencies, including the Defense Department, the C.I.A., the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. On Sept. 11, 2001, some of the investigators were killed when American Airlines Flight 77 was flown by terrorists into the Pentagon.

But the investigation went on. Mr. Dillard’s task force, operating out of public view, looked at the nuclear weapons laboratories, government agencies and defense contractors in California and several other states who had manufactured parts of the warhead. The F.B.I. interviewed the walk-in, who was by now living in the United States, but he could shed no light on the source of the document.

Finally, after four years, the investigation ended with American intelligence agencies no closer to knowing how China obtained the secret design of the nuclear warhead. The answer remains locked up in Beijing.

More than a decade later, China’s spies continue to conduct espionage against military targets. Last year, a Pentagon official was sentenced to prison, the last of 10 people rounded up by the F.B.I., all members of a loosely connected Chinese spy network on the West and East Coasts that was run by Lin Hong, a spymaster in Beijing. The data that made its way to China included information on the Navy’s Quiet Electric Drive, designed to make submarines harder to detect, the B-1 bomber and projected American arms sales to Taiwan.

China has even penetrated the F.B.I. In 2003, Katrina Leung, an F.B.I. informant for two decades, was found to be working as a double agent for Beijing. Astonishingly, the two top F.B.I. agents in California responsible for Chinese counterintelligence were having affairs with Ms. Leung at the same time, allowing her to help herself to classified documents that were brought to her home by one of the agents.

China’s success in stealing American secrets will provide a continuing challenge to the spy catchers. And Washington’s counterintelligence agents, accustomed to the comfortable parameters of the cold war and more recent battles against Al Qaeda, must rethink their priorities and shift their focus, resources and energy eastward to counter China’s spies.

If not, more secrets like the W-88 nuclear warhead will continue to find their way to Beijing.

资源来自美国<纽约时报>